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Utah Code Annotated 76-8-508 (1953 as Amended) 1, 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1990 as Amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There is one issue on appeal. The Appellant submits that 
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction in this 
matter and accordingly the trial court erred in failing to grant 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
In determining the issue on appeal, the standard of review 
is well settled: 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which 
might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury 
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App.1992); State v. 
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App.1991) (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)); accord State v. Jonas, 
793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App.), cert, denied 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISION 
The controlling statutory provision is Utah Code Annotated 
76-8-508 (1953 as Amended) which states as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
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is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify ot inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, 
item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide 
evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or 
investigation to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for 
anything done by another as a witness or 
informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any 
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the 
acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a 
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to 
do bodily injury to the person, because of any 
act performed or to be performed by the person in 
his capacity as a witness or informant in an 
official proceeding or investigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Danny L. Herring was charged of violating the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-8-508 (1953 as Amended). A 
jury trial was held on October 19, 1992 and a verdict of "guilty" 
was returned on the charge of witness tampering. The final 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered by the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding on November 30, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. General Background of the Witnesses. 
1. The prosecution's witness, Troy Lott was twenty-six 
years of age at the time of the trial of this matter (T.10, L.8-
9), and had known the Defendant Danny Herring for approximately 
fourteen to fifteen years (T.5, L.14-18). Troy had actually 
lived with the Defendant at the Defendant's home (T.10, L. 12-
17). 
2. The underlying proceeding giving rise to the charges in 
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this case was a trial in which the Defendant, Danny Herring had 
been charged with assault related crimes and Troy Lott was 
scheduled as a witness for the State of Utah (T.5, L.18-22). 
B. Facts Relating to Prior Conversations Concerning the 
Defendantf s Upcoming Trial. 
3. Approximately thirty days prior to the date set for the 
Defendant's trial on the assault charges, the prosecution's 
witness, Troy Lott, went to the Defendant's home (T.8, L.11-15). 
At the Defendant's house on that occasion were the Defendant, Ty 
Herring (the Defendant's brother), Chris Herring (the Defendant's 
brother), and Jeff Creviston (Troy's nephew). All of the 
individuals present were friends or a relative of the 
prosecution's witness, Troy Lott (T.46, L.3-19; T.10 L.24 
through 11, L.3; T.43, L. 11-19). 
4. Troy Lott, the prosecution's witness, gave conflicting 
testimony about the conversation that took place at the 
Defendant's home. Initially Troy testified as follows: 
Q. You had a conversation with Danny over at his 
house? 
A. I don't recall no conversation about the trial. 
T.ll, L.4-7. 
Troy then testified: 
Q. You don't believe that you discussed the case at 
all? 
A. No, we didn't talk about the case very much. I kind 
of knew not to. (Emphasis added) 
T.ll, L.19-22. 
Troy testified earlier that he did not think that there was any 
conversation at the Defendant's home about the factual scenario 
giving rise to the assault charges or Troy's expected testimony 
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(T.8, L.11-15). In that same tone Troy concluded the subject by 
surmising that he did not think the assault was a topic of 
discussion at the house (T.12, L.l-4). 
5. The Defendant Danny Herring testified clearly and 
consistently. The Defendant testified that he was surprised to 
see Troy at his house after the incident wherein the assault 
allegedly took place because the Defendant "wasn't sure whether 
we <Troy and Danny> were supposed to talk to each other." (T.26, 
L.7-16). The Defendant then testified that Troy Lott then 
volunteered that he had been so drunk on the night the alleged 
assault took place that he could not remember what took place 
(T.26, L.17-20). Troy concluded the conversation by saying that 
"if it comes down to it that if I have to go to court and 
testify, that I'm going to say that it was mostly me and Kevin 
that was doing the fight and that you didn't really have nothing 
to do with it." (T.26, L.21 through 27, L.l). 
C. Facts Relating to Troy Lott's Alleged "Shooting Spree." 
6. It is not disputed that approximately six months before 
their conversation at the Defendant's house, the Defendant and 
Troy Lott had been at a party in Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
party Troy was once again intoxicated. Troy relayed to the 
Defendant that he and some buddies while drinking and driving in 
the hills had shot a man that caught them shooting coyotes and 
buried his body in the lake (T.29, L.ll through 31, L.5; T. 17, 
L. 20 through 18, L.2) At trial, Troy said that the incident was 
not real and had been made up (T.18, L.l,2). 
D. Facts Surrounding the Charge of Witness Tampering. 
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7. As with his testimony relating to the conversation with 
the Defendant at the Defendant's house, Troy Lott's testimony 
concerning the actual incident wherein witness tampering is 
alleged to have occurred varied. Initially, Troy testified as 
that one day before his scheduled appearance at court, the 
Defendant Danny Herring called him and inquired whether Troy 
intended on appearing at the trial the next day and what Troy was 
going to say (T.6, L.13-19). Troy testified that he then told 
the Defendant that he was going to tell the truth and testify the 
same way as he did at the preliminary hearing (T.7, L.10-13). 
8. Troy then testified on direct examination as follows: 
Q. Did he say anything else to you? 
A. He asked me if I remembered him kicking me in 
the face. That he didn't recall himself kick-
ing me in the face. 
Q. Did you respond to that? 
A. Yes, I Told him that I remembered that you did, and 
I was going to say the same -- I was going to tell 
the truth, the same thing I said in the 
preliminary. 
Q. Did he say anything at that point? 
A. He said it would really help him a lot if I didn't 
testify to that. 
Q. Did he say anything else to you? 
A. He brought up a time of we was having a party at a 
friend's house in Pleasant Grove, and I guess I'd 
told him about a shooting spree or something. He 
brought that up and said if I was to testify to-
morrow, I'd be better off if I didn't testify to-
morrow or he would bring that up. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. I told him I was still going to tel the truth and I 
think that was about the end of the conversation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
T.7, L.13 through 8, L. 10. 
9. On cross-examination, Troy's testimony varied. Troy 
testified consistently that the Defendant first asked him if he 
was going to testify and then inquired as to the subject matter 
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of Troy's expected testimony (T. 13, L.8 through 14, L.19). Troy 
conceded that the Defendant then told him that he could not 
remember kicking Troy in the face and inquired whether Troy could 
have hurt himself when he jumped in the back of the truck (T.15, 
L. 13 through 16, L.8). At that juncture, the Defendant 
allegedly brought up the "shooting spree" that Troy was allegedly 
involved in and troy responded, "well, we'll see you tomorrow," 
and hung up the phone (T.16, L.18-25). 
10. Troy Lott testified unequivocally that the Defendant 
made no physical threats of any kind (T. 17, L. 4-9). As it 
relates to the Defendant's alleged statement that he would bring 
up Troy's alleged shooting spree, Troy testified conclusively 
that the story was made up by him and that there was no such 
incident. Accordingly, Troy testified that the Defendant's 
statement that he would bring up the incident did not worry him 
(T. L.16 through 19, L.ll). 
11. The Defendant testified that the phone conversation 
with Troy proceeded as follows: 
Q. What, to the best of your recollection, 
exactly what was aid by you and Troy? 
A. Well, Troy answered the phone and I said, "hello," 
and he said, "hello." I asked him how he was 
doing. He said he was doing all right. 
Then I asked him if he was going to have to show 
up in court the next day and he said, "yeah, I've 
been subpoenaed to show up in court." Then I 
asked him, "wee, are you going to still tell 
them what you told me at my house?" And he told 
me that he didn't remember talking to me at my 
house or even being there, as a matter of fact, 
more or less. 
Then I said, "well, don't you remember telling me 
that you don't really remember what happened be-
cause you were so drunk and that I really didn't 
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have nothing to do with the fight and it was mostly 
you and Kevin?" And he told me that he didn't 
remember saying that and that he's going to get up 
there and tell them what he said in the preliminary 
hearing. 
Q. What was the next thing that was said? 
A. And then he said, "And I think you know that you 
kicked me in the head twice and I think you ought 
to think about that." Then I said "well, I think 
you ought to think about the gun spree you told me 
about," and then I hung up the phone. 
T.28, L.l through 29, L.3. 
12| In explaining the conversation, the Defendant testified 
that he thought Troy was being "smart" with him and he simply 
reacted as if to say, "Hey, big deal. Think about this." (T.32, 
L.6-19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the evidence, taken 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution does not justify a 
finding of guilt and that the Court should reverse the decision 
and grant the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the 
Defendant contends that the statements alleged to have been made 
by him to the State's witness, Troy Lott, do not rise to a level 




THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
WARRANT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
A review of the case law is instructive as to the type of 
conduct that is deemed sufficient to warrant conviction. The 
conduct must be such to imply culpability and exclude innocent or 
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incidental conversation. The Supreme Court dealt with the 
relevant statute in State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981). 
In that case the Defendant Terry Carlsen was convicted of witness 
tampering. Paul Hardy was to be the principal witness against 
the defendant on a charge of disturbing the peace. On the day 
before trial on that charge the defendant Carlsen and his friend 
Teeples ran into Hardy at a mall and Teeples testified that the 
Defendant told him to tell Hardy that he had better not show up 
at court the next day and that if he did he was going to be dead, 
that they would kill him. Id. at 514. The Court found that the 
evidence was sufficient to warrant the conviction. In that case, 
there was language that could clearly be determined as 
threatening and certainly not of a category of incidental or 
innocent comment. The State's witness clearly could, as he 
testified, have been concerned for his personal safety and 
justifiably reconsider whether he should testify. Id. at 14. 
Contrasted with that situation are the facts in State v. 
Rempel, 114 Wash.2d 77, 785 P.2d 1134 (1990). The defendant Dale 
Rempel and Diane DuBois had been friends for a number of years 
and had been intimate on at least on occasion. Prior to the 
incident giving rise to the criminal charges, the defendant had 
stayed at DuBois' apartment while she was out of town. When she 
returned, DuBois testified that the defendant resisted her 
attempts to have him move out and on the night in question 
attempted to rape her. The defendant denied the allegations but 
was arrested. While in jail, the defendant attempted to call 
DuBois a number of times but she only accepted two or three 
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collect calls. The substance of those calls constitute all of 
the evidence of witness tampering against the defendant. In 
those conversations the defendant related that he was sorry, that 
it was going to ruin his life and asked DuBois to drop the 
charges. Id. at 1135-36. 
The Washington Supreme Court held, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that the trier 
of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
The sum of the defendant's attempts are an apology, a 
statement that "it" was going to ruin his life, and a request 
that DuBois "drop the Charges." The literal words contain no 
express threat nor any promise of reward. The words "drop the 
charges" reflect a lay person's perception that the complaining 
witness can cause a prosecution to be discontinued. . . However, 
an attempt to induce a witness to withhold testimony does not 
depend only upon the literal meaning of the words used. The 
State is entitled to rely on the inferential meaning of the words 
and the context in which they were used. [Citing cases] Here the 
State urges us to consider the underlying assaultive nature of 
the crime. We do so, but we consider the entire context in which 
the words were used, which also includes the prior relationship 
between defendant and DuBois and her reaction to the phone calls. 
The entire context negates any inference that the request to 
"drop the charge" was in fact an inducement to withhold testimony 
from a later trial. DuBois testified that the calls did not 
concern her, that she did not worry about them "other that the 
fact that he was a real nuisance." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 1137. 
The Court noted that it was not ruling that the language 
used by the Defendant could never support a conviction but the 
Court said: 
. . .However, the witness' reaction here is relevant because 
it tends to disprove the State's claim that the context of the 
words spoken shows an attempt to induce DuBois to withhold 
testimony. 
Id. at 1137. 
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Many of the cases dealt with by the Utah Appellate Courts 
have involved cases of obvious threats and blatant conduct that 
do not bear any resemblance to the facts of this case. See State 
v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 
874 (Utah 1985); and State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 442 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). 
A closer case was presented to the Court in State v. Burk, 
839 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). In that case the Defendant Burk 
asked Ivan Phipps to accompany him to Jennifer Power's home to 
help him burn her car. Phipps was caught and charged. Prior to 
the time that the defendant Burk was charged, Burk talked to 
Phipps and told him to "[j]ust stick it out," while Burk tried to 
"figure out ways to have good excuses or anything like that." Id. 
at 882, 885. Burk further asked Phipps to testify that he " 
hadn't done it" and "knew nothing about it." Additionally Burk 
talked to Phipps about possible alibis. Id. at 882, 885. 
In writing the majority opinion Judge Russon stated: 
. . .That testimony demonstrates that Burk asked Phipps to 
testify that Phipps had not committed the crime, and that he knew 
nothing about it. By doing so, Burk not only attempted to induce 
or otherwise cause Phipps to testify falsely, but also attempted 
to induce or otherwise cause him to withhold critical testimony 
about the crime. 
Id. at 885. 
In his opinion, dissenting in part, Judge Orme drew some 
distinctions that are critical in the case at bar. 
. . .Phipp's testimony about his pretrial discussions with 
Burk does not establish either that Burk "attempt[ed] to induce" 
Phipps to withhold testimony or that he " attempt [ed] to . . . 
otherwise cause" Phipps to withhold testimony. 
Careful review of Phipp's testimony indicates that Burk 
wanted Phipps to stick it out while they figured out "good 
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excuses or anything like that;" that the two merely discussed 
"possible alibis" concerning where Phipps and Burk "could have 
been"; and that Burk wanted Phipps to testify that he, Phipps, 
had not committed the crime and knew nothing of the crime. . . 
. . . The mere fact that one wants a particular thing, and 
has made that desire known to another, does not necessarily mean 
he has asked the other to bring it about. 
The most that can be said of Burk's discussions with Phipps 
is that Burk registered with Phipps a personal preference that 
Phipps withhold testimony damaging to Burk. This mere desire, 
however, where not coupled with some tangible indicia of 
inducement or causation, is not criminal. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 888-89. Judge Orme noted that the statements were not 
accompanied by threats, promises or extensive argument to evade 
and thus did not constitute sufficient evidence to warrant 
conviction. Id. at 889. 
As it relates to the facts of this case, it is respectfully 
submitted that the rhetoric used by the Defendant in the 
telephone conversation with Troy Lott was not culpable conduct 
either when examined as a whole or dissected into its individual 
components. 
The first part of the conversation involved the discussion 
by the Defendant and Troy Lott as to whether or not Troy was to 
appear at court. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
all the Defendant did was to inquire whether or not Troy was 
going to appear at trial the next day. There is nothing in that 
communication that would even hint that the Defendant was 
attempting to overtly or by subtlety influence the witness to 
"elude legal process" or "absent himself from the proceeding" 
that was scheduled the next day (T.6, L.15 through 7, L.2); 
U.C.A. 76-8-508(l)(c) and (d) (1953 as Amended). 
As the State's witness testified, the next part of the 
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conversation involved the Defendantfs query as to the substance 
of Troy Lott's expected testimony. As detailed by Mr. Lott, the 
Defendant asked Troy what the substance of his testimony was 
going to be. Troy responded that he was going to tell the truth 
and that was what he had done when testifying at the Defendant's 
preliminary hearing. Again, when viewed only on the basis of the 
State's evidence, there is absolutely nothing improper about the 
Defendant's question. Mr. Herring, by asking Troy the substance 
of his expected testimony did nothing to try to alter or affect 
Troy's testimony and thereby violate any of the specifics of the 
witness tampering statute. There is no prohibition against 
interviewing a witness or inquiring into the knowledge of a 
witness on relevant subject matter (T.7, L.7 through 12); U.C.A. 
76-8-508(l)(a),(b)(1953 as Amended). 
The third part of the conversation, according to the State's 
evidence is the Defendant's comment, as described by Troy Lott, 
that he could not remember kicking Troy in the face and inquiring 
whether Troy could really recall that event. Again, it is hard 
to manufacture an argument that such interrogation is violative 
of the relevant statute or even remotely improper (T.7, L.13-21); 
U.C.A. 76-8-508(1)(a),(b)(1953 as Amended). In any interrogation 
whether conducted by a police officer at a traffic accident, a 
lawyer prior to or at trial or by mothers seeking to find the 
truth about events in their children's lives, delving into 
specifics is proper and obviously a permissible means of 
determining the extent of a witness' memory. The fact that Troy 
Lott had testified at a preliminary hearing ought not be 
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considered somehow dispositive of the issues regarding Troy 
Lott's testimony. As the Court knows, there is no prepared 
script to be read at a preliminary hearing. Because of the 
relatively light standard of proof at that proceeding, the State 
may call only a portion of the witnesses that have knowledge 
concerning the affair or ask only limited questions. Many times 
the lawyer for the defense and the Defendant hear for the first 
time the knowledge of various witnesses about the relevant 
events. Certainly, questioning after a preliminary hearing 
directed to aspects of the witness' testimony that may have been 
missed or lightly covered at preliminary hearing is not violative 
of any legal or ethical guidelines. As indicated in the 
testimony,the Defendant felt that Troy injured himself when, in 
an intoxicated condition, he fell into the back of the truck. 
Inquiring into that matter and asking Troy if he could really 
remember the Defendant kicking him was proper and certainly not 
criminal. 
The fourth part of the conversation as related by Mr. Lott 
is the Defendant's statement that it would really help him if 
Troy did not testify about being kicked in the head by the 
Defendant (T.7, L.22 to 24). Again the mere conveyance to a 
witness of what testimony is and is not in a person's interest is 
not improper. As noted by Judge Orme on Burk, Supra., 
. . . The mere fact that one wants a particular thing, 
and has made that desire known to another, does not necessarily 
mean he has asked the other to bring it about. 
Id. at 889. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the 
Defendant simply told the witness, Troy Lott, that it would not 
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be in his interest if he testified that the defendant kicked him 
in the head. That statement does not violate any of the 
provisions of the statute and when coupled with the Defendant's 
explanation is totally innocent. The Defendant, rightly or 
wrongly, was under the impression that Troy's testimony about the 
incident in question was influenced by severe intoxication. The 
Defendant believed that Troy had admitted to him that he could 
not really remember how he got hurt. When confronted with Troy's 
answers on the telephone that he was going to testify that the 
Defendant kicked him, it was to be expected that the Defendant 
would examine him further on the issue of the witness' memory and 
try to establish for Troy, the issues affected by his testimony. 
The statement was simply a device employed by the Defendant to 
alert the witness that such testimony would not be in Mr. 
Herring's best interest and therefore he should really reflect on 
his memory as to his recollection before so testifying. 
The fifth and last part of the conversation relates to the 
Defendant's statement to Troy that if Troy testified in 
accordance with his stated intent, the Defendant would bring up 
the so-called "shooting spree." (T.7, L.25 through 8, L. 6). It 
is respectfully submitted that it is at this juncture that the 
Court must consider that the Defendant and the witness had known 
each other for nearly fifteen years, had been good friends and 
had even lived together in the Defendant's home. As related in 
the Statement of Facts, Troy relates this segment of the 
conversation as occurring at the end of the conversation, just 
prior to both hanging up the phones. Troy testified that the 
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Defendant made the statement after he failed to give up any 
ground on the issue of whether he was kicked by the Defendant or 
injured as he fell into the back of the truck (T.7, L.25 through 
8, L. 10). Troy testified on direct examination that after the 
Defendant's statement that he would bring up the shooting spree 
that he said that he was still going to tell the truth and hung 
up. On Cross-examination, he testified that both individuals 
simply said "bye" and hung up the phones without further comment 
(T.16, L. 18-25). 
The Defendant testified that Troy was being "smart" with him 
and told him, "And I think you know that you kicked me in the 
head twice and I think you ought to think about that." (T.28, L. 
22-25). In essence, Troy was calling the Defendant a liar, 
accusing the Defendant of mis-stating his real memory of the 
events of the alleged assault. In response, the Defendant made 
the comment, "well, I think you ought to think about the gun 
spree you told me about." (T.28, L.25 through 26, L.3). 
If the Court reviews the comment in light of the 
familiarity of the parties, it is respectfully submitted that the 
statement was harmless and incidental. An off the cuff remark 
that was not pursued by either party after it was said should not 
be taken as culpable. Neither Troy or the Defendant thought 
enough about it to comment any further. According to both of 
their testimonies, both simply hung up the phone. When the 
comment is viewed in the light of their relationship and the 
Defendant's perception of the witness' rudeness, it is unfair to 
hang a witness tampering charge on that one phrase. As the Court 
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did in Rempel, Supra,, when the conversation is viewed in light 
of the on-going relationship of the parties, the statements lose 
any real portrayal of evil intent or deed. 
Lastly, to be considered a threat, the statement must be 
capable of being reasonably construed as such by the parties 
involved. The witness, Troy Lott, testified that the story, if 
he did tell the Defendant, was made up and had no truth in fact. 
Accordingly, Troy was not worried about the statement made by the 
Defendant (T.19, L.6-7). The Defendant had reported the 
incident to his lawyer long before the conversation and knew the 
same to be untrue (T.31, L.12 through 33, L. 13). Even in the 
light most favorable to the State, the comment of the Defendant 
can hardly be construed as a threat by either the Defendant or 
witness. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is not 
sufficient to justify or sustain a conviction of witness 
tampering and that this Court in analyzing the background of the 
parties, the substance of the conversation of the parties on one 
occasion and the legal standard established in reviewing these 
matters, should reverse the conviction. 
DATED this ^A day of July, 1993 ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that o copies of the Appellant's Brief were 
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mailed, postage prepaid to Ms. Jan Graham, Attorney General at 
the address set out on the face of this pleading on the «^ 
day of July, 1993. 
<-<•< rf <•• ^ • ^ 2 J 
Steven B. Killpack, #1808 
Public Defender's Office 
Attorney for Appellant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone (801) 379-2570 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DANNY L. HERRING, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
REGARDING ADDENDUM TO 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 930006-CA 
Criminal No. 921400274 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Steven B. Killpack, after first being duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am counsel for the Appellant in the above referenced 
matter. I did not represent the Appellant at trial but represent 
his interests on appeal. 
2. I have read the Record and the Transcript in this matter 
and prepared the Appellant's Brief. I was advised orally that a 
Notice was being issued by this Court with regard to 
irregularities in the brief. Specifically, I was advised that 
the priority number was not attached, which the Clerk of the 
Court has indicated will be written on the Brief. Secondly, that 
the position of the designation of the attorneys on the cover 
page is juxtaposed and the Clerk has agreed to waive that 
deficiency. Lastly, I was advised that an Addendum to the 
Appellant's Brief was due on Friday, August, 27, 1993. 
3. I have again gone over the case and the brief carefully. 
I specifically reviewed Rule 24 and in particular, Rule 24(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. There are no "opinions, 
memorandum of decision, finding of fact, conclusions of law, or 
order pertaining to the issues on appeal" or any other part of 
the record that in my opinion requires attachment to the 
Appellant's Brief. All references to the Transcript are 
believed to be complete and fair. All decisions are adequately 
detailed and set forth in the Brief. 
4. Unless the Court wishes the case law cited and the 
portions of the transcript quoted to be attached in the Addendum 
as part of it's policy, I believe the Appellant's brief is 
proper and conforms to the Rules. Further, I do not believe that 
the Appellant's position would be enhanced by the compilation of 
an Addendum. 
5. Of course, if the Court desires portions of the 
transcript or case law attached, pursuant to it's preference in 
these matters, I will of course comply. 
DATED this ^fT" day of August, 1993. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Danny Herring, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F9LED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG 2 0 1993 
• / - Mary T. Noonan 
r Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 930006-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion 
for leave to file a late brief, filed July 26, 1993. Appellee 
stipulated to the motion. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is 
granted leave to file a late brief. The brief filed by 
appellant on 26 July 1993, however does not contain an addendum 
pursuant to Rule 24(f), Utah R. App. P. Appellant shall have 
until 27 August 1993 to file the required addendum or inform 
the Court that no addendum is required. Appellee shall 
thereafter have until 27 September to file appellee's brief. 
Dated this of August, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of August, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the party listed below: 
Steven B. Killpack 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney 
General's Office to be delivered to the parties listed below: 
Jan Graham 
State Attorney General 
Kris C. Leonard 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dated this 20th day of August, 1993. 
